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Abstract
This paper identiﬁes the main bank speciﬁc determinants of bank fail-
ure during the ﬁnancial crisis in Colombia using duration analysis. Using
partial likelihood estimation, it shows that the process of failure of ﬁnancial
institutions during that period can be explained by diﬀerences in ﬁnancial
health and prudence across institutions. The capitalization ratio is the most
signiﬁcant indicator explaining bank failure. Increases in this ratio lead to
a reduction in the hazard rate of failure at any given moment in time. Of
special relevance, this ratio exhibits a non-linear component. Our results thus
provide empirical support for existing regulatory practice. Other important
variables explaining bank failure dynamics are bank’s size and proﬁtability.
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11 Introduction
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Colombia’s ﬁnancial system experienced a
period of ﬁnancial stress, characterized by the failure of many banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions, as well as by the severe deterioration of the whole system’s
ﬁnancial health. The capitalization ratio of the system fell dramatically, as did prof-
itability and liquidity. As a consequence of the crisis, the number of institutions1,
110 in June 1998, dropped to only 57 in December 2001, after failures, mergers
and acquisitions. Total assets of the ﬁnancial system experienced a real contraction
of more than 20 percent during the same period, making that episode of ﬁnancial
stress the deepest ﬁnancial crisis experienced by the country in the last century.
The literature on the ﬁnancial crisis of Colombia has concentrated in explaining
its causes and consequences. See Arias et al (1999), Arbeláez et al. (2003), Car-
rasquilla and Zárate (2002), Parra and Salazar (2000), Uribe and Vargas (2002),
Urrutia (1999) and Villar et al (2005). There have been no micro-level studies of
t h er o l eo fs p e c i ﬁc ﬁnancial variables in determining failure and time to failure of
banks. This paper uses duration models to characterize the failure rates of ﬁnan-
cial institutions in Colombia and to identify key ﬁnancial variables associated with
these failure rates. Duration models use hazard functions rather than densities to
specify the distribution of observables (and thus the likelihood function). For the
method, see Kiefer (1988) and Lancaster (1990). Although early economic applica-
tions of hazard functions or duration analysis were in labor economics, they have
been applied to bank failures. Lane et al (1986), Weelock and Wilson (1995), and
Whalen (1991), use duration models to explain bank failure in the United States.
Other studies have used duration models to explain time to failure after particular
episodes of ﬁnancial stress in under-developed countries. For example, Gonzalez-
Hermosillo et al (1996) use them to explain bank failure after the Mexican crisis of
1994, and Carree (2003) does a hazard rate analysis of Russian commercial banks
in the period 1994-1997.
1The ﬁnancial system here includes commercial banks, ﬁnancial companies, and ﬁnancial com-
panies specialized in commercial leasing. Financial cooperatives and special public ﬁnancial insti-
tutions are not included here.
2There are theoretical as well as practical reasons to consider that the capital-
ization ratio plays a special role for ﬁnancial institutions. The literature on capital
crunch shows that, under capital regulations, this ratio is important for ﬁnancial
institutions when they are taking decisions on portfolio composition. See Peek and
Rosengren (1995), Estrella et al (2000), and Van den Heuvel (2004). In the practical
world, following the Basel accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004),
ﬁnancial institutions and supervisors now follow closely the capital ratio of the in-
stitutions they regulate, and impose minimum requirements. Thus, capitalization
plays a special role for ﬁnancial institutions in determining their overall ﬁnancial
health and thus the degree of trouble that they might experience in episodes of
ﬁnancial stress. We focus on the capitalization variable and identify a nonlinear
eﬀect. As might be expected, increasing the capitalization ratio decreases the prob-
ability of default at a decreasing rate. Although capitalization is sometimes one of
several signiﬁcant variables, previous studies have not identiﬁed this nonlinearity,
possibly due to the relative lack of data information in datasets with few failures.
The data set used here is unusually rich, in two senses: First, survival is measured
on a monthly scale, which helps identify more precisely the moment of failure of
ﬁnancial institutions. Most of the previous studies use quarterly data, which is the
frequency in which ﬁnancial institutions report their balances to the supervisors in
many countries. Second, due to Colombia’s ﬁnancial crisis, there are enough failures
to identify and measure signiﬁcant eﬀects of ﬁnancial variables. We expect that our
qualitative results are likely to be applicable to modern banking systems generally,
though we would hesitate to extrapolate numerical values of coeﬃcients outside of
our application.
Regarding the literature on the ﬁnancial crisis of Colombia, this paper con-
tributes by providing microeconomic evidence on the main variables determining
bank failure, and by providing a model which can be used as an early warning tool
that can be an alternative to the costly on-site visits made by supervisors to insti-
tutions considered at risk. It also provides the supervisors a basic guideline about
which ﬁnancial variables are important to follow during moments of stress.
Section 2 brieﬂy describes what happened during the episode of ﬁnancial crisis
3in Colombia. Section 3 presents the description of the data. Section 4 presents
the techniques used to construct a model for the failure of ﬁnancial institutions.
Section 5 presents the results of the estimation, as well as empirical tests to check
the validity of the model. Section 6 presents some empirical evidence using time
varying regressors. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2T h e ﬁnancial crisis in Colombia
During the 1980s, Colombia’s ﬁnancial system was subject to elevated reserve re-
quirements and forced investments, and to strong constraints on foreign investment,
as well as on the types of operations that intermediaries could do and on interest
rates2. Additionally, a process of bank nationalization was held during that decade.
In contrast, at the beginning of the 1990s, a program of ﬁnancial liberalization was
implemented. The process was supported by the laws 45 of 1990 and 9 of 1991,
which eased the conditions for the entrance of foreign investment to Colombia, pro-
moted more competition in the ﬁnancial system, and gave ﬁnancial institutions
more liberty in the management of ﬁnancial operations and interest rates (Banrep,
2002).
As a result, the ratio of intermediated assets (loans plus bonds) to GDP in-
creased from 31 percent in 1990 to 47 percent in 1996. The number of ﬁnancial
institutions increased signiﬁcantly, the participation of the assets of foreign banks
in the total assets of the system increased, and most of the government-owned
ﬁnancial institutions were privatized.
As a consequence of the growth in the ﬁnancial system and of the economic
expansion that took place during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, between 1991 and 1997
Colombia registered a credit boom without precedent. The ratio of loans to GDP
and the price of assets (ﬁnancial and real) grew steadily, as well as the number of
intermediaries. But, as is often the case during the processes of quick expansion
2These were requirements imposed by the Superintendencia Bancaria, which at the time of the
crisis was the regulator of the ﬁnancial system in Colombia.
4of credit after processes of ﬁnancial liberalization3, the quality of loans of ﬁnancial
institutions decreased, and this elevated the ﬁnancial fragility of the economy4.
Between 1998 and 1999 a sudden capital reversion occurred, followed by a steep
fall in the terms of trade, which led to a reduction in the aggregate level of expendi-
ture. This has been identiﬁed as the main cause of both the ﬁnancial crisis and the
economic recession experienced in Colombia recently (Villar et al ,2005). Internal
demand fell, especially during 1999, as well as output, while interest rates increased
to historically high levels. However, as Parra and Salazar (2000) argue, monetary
policy played also a role in increasing the vulnerability of the system, when in June
1998, the Central Bank while defending the exchange rate band added extra pres-
sure on interest rates. The average interest rate on ninety-days CDT’s5 increased
more that 500 basis points in one month, while the average interest rate on loans
increased almost 1000 basis points in the same period of time. From that moment
on, a sharp deterioration of the ﬁnancial health of the intermediaries began. Loan
quality decreased - i.e., the rate of non-performing loans to total loans for the sys-
tem increased from 7.9% in June 1998 to 16% by the end of 1999-, and the losses of
ﬁnancial institutions, which had very low levels of provisions, led to a reduction of
capital and a worsening of capitalization. The reduction in the capitalization ratio
was common for all the institutions, but was asymmetric, doing more damage to
those that had low capitalization levels before the crisis. Most of those institutions
were liquidated, either forced by the Superintendencia Bancaria (hereafter Super-
bancaria, the ﬁnancial system’s supervisor) or voluntarily. Others merged, or were
absorbed by other ﬁnancial institutions.
The liquidation process of ﬁnancial institutions is regulated by the Estatuto
3For example, Carree (2003) argues that the process of bank liquidation that occurred in Russia
during the period 1995-1998 (the Central Bank of Russia withdrew about 1000 bank licenses during
that period), can be explained by the period of ease in ﬁnancial regulation policies that took place
during the early 1990s.
4During the ascendant part of the cycle, the fragilities of the ﬁnancial system were not very
visible. Most of the ﬁnancial intermediaries obtained high proﬁtability levels, in many occasions
coming from the higher levels of risk undertaken by them, as well as by low levels of provisions.
When the downturn began, ﬁnancial fragility became evident as loans damaged, deteriorating the
ﬁn a n c i a ls y s t e m s ’c a p i t a l .
5Mainly time deposits issued by ﬁnancial institutions to ﬁnance their positions in assets.
5Orgánico del Sistema Financiero (Suberbancaria, 2006). The decision to liquidate
an institution is taken to protect the depositors and the ﬁnancial stability of the
system. When a decision to liquidate is taken by the Superbancaria, it becomes
eﬀective immediately. The legal representative of the institution and the general
public are informed about the decision and the Superbancaria takes control of the
institution. The Superbancaria then chooses a liquidator who is in charge of liqui-
dating the assets of the bank and repaying the depositors and other creditors of the
failed institution.
The period of ﬁnancial stress generated a reduction in the size of the ﬁnancial
intermediation industry of Colombia and a change in the asset composition of the
ﬁnancial system. In terms of size, the ratio of intermediated assets to GDP reduced
to 38 percent in 2000. In terms of asset composition, the participation of loans in
the asset of banks was reduced, giving space to the acquisition of more securities.
Financial institutions became more conservative in their lending policies, in order
to maintain higher capitalization levels. Similarly, the ratio of provisions to loans
of surviving institutions grew steadily. As a consequence, concentration of the
ﬁnancial system increased, mainly due to the processes of liquidation, and mergers
and acquisitions of institutions that took place during the period of stress.
3 Description of the data
In June 1998 there were 110 institutions in the ﬁnancial system of Colombia, ex-
cluding ﬁnancial cooperatives and special public ﬁnancial institutions. From those
institutions considered here as the ﬁnancial system, 39 were commercial banks, 43
were ﬁnancial companies, and the remaining 28 were ﬁnancial companies special-
ized in commercial leasing. Three and a half years later, the ﬁnancial system was
constituted by only 57 institutions: 27 commercial banks, 19 ﬁnancial companies,
and 11 ﬁnancial companies specialized in commercial leasing.
Although there are some diﬀerences between commercial banks and ﬁnancial
companies, basically regarding liability composition6 and size, in practical terms
6The main diﬀerence can be found in demand deposits: while commercial banks can issue
6both types of institutions serve very similar purposes and compete in the issuance of
loans and deposits. However, ﬁnancial companies specialized in commercial leasing
are quite diﬀerent, in the sense that they have diﬀerent purposes than the other
intermediaries mentioned before, and their activities and portfolio composition are
also very diﬀerent. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, data are collected only
from commercial banks and ﬁnancial companies.
Since we are interested in explaining time to failure during the ﬁnancial crisis,
the period of observation is the 42 months elapsed from June 1998, the moment
in which the crisis began, and December 2001, when the system started its period
of recovery. Financial data as of June 1998 was collected for each of the ﬁnancial
institutions considered for the empirical analysis7. Following previous studies and
theoretical expectations, the following ﬁnancial ratios were considered in the ex-
planation of time to failure: capitalization (CAP), deﬁned as the ratio of equity
to assets; management eﬃciency (EFF), approximated by the ratio of operating
expenses to average annual assets; proﬁtability of assets (PROF), given by the ratio
of annualized proﬁts to average annual assets; loan participation (LOAN), given
by total loans over total assets; loan composition (COMP), deﬁned as the ratio
of commercial loans to total loans; and, a market based variable (SIZE), deﬁned
as the assets of the institution divided by a common number to scale the variable
appropriately. These ﬁnancial indicators are proxies of the variables traditionally
considered in the literature. The variables COMP and LOAN can be interpreted as
portfolio characteristics potentially related to volatility.
This paper emphasizes the special role played by the capitalization ratio, iden-
tifying a non-linear impact of this ratio on time to bank failure in Colombia. To
account for a non-linear component of capitalization, a variable called CAPL was
included. This variable results from the multiplication of (CAP-C) by an indica-
checking accounts, ﬁnancial companies cannot. Nevertheless, they can issue saving deposits and
time deposits. Another diﬀerence is the required amount of initial capital: the minimum required
capital to constitute a bank is almost three times as big as that needed to constitute a ﬁnancial
company. Nevertheless, initial capital requirements are small vis-à-vis the size of the intermediaries
once they are operating.
7For an extension reported in Section 6, we collect monthly data on each of the ﬁnancial
variables.
7tor function that takes the value 1 if CAP is less or equal to C and 0 otherwise.
We experimented with diﬀe r e n tv a l u e so fC .O u rp u r p o s eh e r ei st oa p p r o x i m a t ea
nonlinearity of unknown functional form with a simple approximation. As it turns
out, the data are informative enough to identify a signiﬁcant nonlinearity, but not
informative enough to tie down its functional form precisely.
The data set used to construct the variables consists of information of the balance
sheets that ﬁnancial institutions have to report to the Superbancaria. Table 1 shows
a summary of the indicators for both groups of intermediaries in June 1998.
Table 1: Summary of the ﬁnancial ratios used in the empirical analysis
(In percentage for all variables, except SIZE, measured in millions of Colombian pesos)
Banks Percentile Others Percentile Overall Percentile
25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75
CAP 8.7 12.8 15.4 CAP 13.3 18.1 29.0 CAP 11.4 14.4 21.0
EFF 3.1 3.9 5.1 EFF 1.5 2.5 3.6 EFF 2.3 3.3 4.4
PROF -0.3 0.6 0.9 PROF -1.2 0.08 0.9 PROF -0.7 0.3 0.9
LOAN 58.4 66.3 77.5 LOAN 58.5 67.5 73.2 LOAN 58.5 67.3 75.2
COMP 26.7 70.2 81.1 COMP 23.1 63.3 99.4 COMP 24.9 67.5 91.0
SIZE 432.2 980.1 2452.8 SIZE 36.4 110.1 275.5 SIZE 103.2 299.9 1196.1
Looking at medians, ﬁnancial companies appear to be more capitalized than
banks, and to be smaller, more eﬃcient and less proﬁtable also. However, there are
large variations within each type of institution. Note also that medians of asset and
loan composition are similar for banks and ﬁnancial companies; in this sense, the
latter can be considered as small banks. Most correlations between the variables
were small and in no case did one exceed 0.51 in absolute value.
Regarding failure, from the group of banks 12 failures were observed between
June 1998 and December 2001, representing a failure rate of 31 percent; meanwhile,
16 institutions of the group of non-banks failed during the same period, representing
a failure rate of 37 percent8. Overall, there are 82 institutions in the sample, of which
8In this paper, failure is considered as the event in which an institution is liquidated, either
828 failed. Failure rates of both groups of intermediaries appear similar. In the next
section tests are done to show that both groups have the same survivor function.
4 Duration models to study bank failure
We use a duration or hazard function model to study the time to failure of ﬁnancial
institutions. This approach generalizes the more common binary response (logit or
probit) approach by modeling not only the occurrence of failure but the time to
failure - allowing ﬁner measurement of the eﬀect of diﬀerent variables on failure.
Thus, duration models applied to this problem can provide answers to questions
that are relevant for both ﬁnancial supervisors and ﬁnancial institutions, such as:
after the occurrence of a negative shock, what is the probability that a bank fails
in the following months given it has survived up to that moment?; or, what is
the predicted time to failure for a bank of some given characteristics? A model
capable of answering those questions at low cost can be very useful as an early
warning model, to identify potential vulnerabilities of the ﬁnancial system, and
could be used by supervisors as an alternative to the costly site visits that they
make periodically to ﬁnancial institutions considered at risk.
Most of the papers that apply these models to explain time to bank failure use
the semiparametric proportional hazards model of Cox (1972); an exception is the
work of Carree (2003), who uses several parametric models to explain bank failure
in Russia. The proportional hazards model is the most frequently used, because
it does not make assumptions about the particular functional form of the baseline
hazard, and because estimated hazard functions of bank failure in many cases are
non-monotonic, thus reducing the number of parametric models that can be used.
by the decision of the regulator (forced failure) or by the decision of the institution’s managers
(“voluntary” failure). The moment in which the bank fails is deﬁned as the month in which the
institution is liquidated formally; that is, the moment at which the institution stops reporting its
balances to the Superbancaria. Even when this is not a exact measure of the moment in which a
bank fails, it appears to be the best possible approximation, and the fact that the balance sheets
of ﬁnancial institutions are reported on a monthly frequency, rather than a quarterly frequency as
in other countries makes this measure more accurate. Institutions that merged or were acquired
are not considered as a failure here.
94.1 Survivor functions and hazard functions
In duration models, the dependent variable is duration, the time that takes a system
to change from one state to another. In the case of bank failure, duration is the
time that it takes for a bank to fail after the occurrence of a negative shock that
aﬀects the ﬁnancial system.
In theory, duration T is a non-negative, continuous random variable. However,
in practice duration is usually represented by an integer number of months, for
example. When T can take a large number of integer values, it is conventional to
model duration as being continuous (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004).
Duration can be represented by its density function f(t) or its cumulative
distribution function F(t),w h e r eF(t)=Pr(T ≤ t),f o rag i v e nt.T h e s u r -
vival function, which is an alternative way of representing duration, is given by
S(t)=1− F(t)=Pr(T>t ). In words, the survival function represents the prob-
ability that the duration of an event is larger that a given t. Now, the probability
that a state ends between period t and t + ∆t, given that it has lasted up to time
t,i sg i v e nb y
Pr(t<T≤ t + ∆t | T>t )=
F(t + ∆t) − F(t)
S(t)
(1)
This is the conditional probability that the state ends in a short time after t,
provided it has reached time t. For example, in the case of bank failure it is the
probability that a bank changes of state from operating to not operating (i.e. fails)
in a short time after time t, conditional on the fact that the bank was still operating
at time t.
The hazard function λ(t), which is another way of characterizing the distribution
of T, results from considering the limit when ∆t → 0 of equation (1). This function
gives the instantaneous probability rate that a change of state occurs, given that
it has not happened up to moment t.T h ec u m u l a t i v ehazard function Λ(t) is the
integral of the hazard function. The relation between the hazard function, the




λ(u)du = −log[S(t)] (2)
Some empirical studies use parametric models for duration. Commonly used
distributions are the exponential, the Weibull and the Gompertz. The exponential
implies a constant hazard while the Weibull admits decreasing or increasing hazards.
The Gompertz distribution allows non-monotonic hazard rates, but is not partic-
ularly ﬂexible. Further, the baseline hazard in our formulation reﬂects changes in
macroeconomic conditions common to all the institutions. There is no reason to
think these will correspond to a monotonic hazard, and indeed we ﬁnd evidence it
does not.
We begin by estimating the unconditional (raw: no covariates) survivor func-
tion, using the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimator, which takes into account
censored data. Suppose that bank failure is observed at diﬀerent moments in time,
t1,t 2,...,tm,a n dt h a tdi banks fail at time ti











where Ni represents the total number of banks that were still operating at time ti.
The failure pattern of banks and of other ﬁnancial institutions during the ﬁ-
nancial crisis of Colombia was similar in terms of percentage of institutions failing.
That suggests that the survival functions of both groups might be similar. Table 2
shows summary data about the dynamics of ﬁnancial institutions failure. Figure 1
shows the estimated survival function for both groups of intermediaries. These look
similar. In order to corroborate that intuition, tests of equality of the survival func-
tions were done. Table 3 shows the results of these tests. Note that these tests are
crude and exploratory because they do not condition on the bank-speciﬁc ﬁnancial
variables. Nevertheless, they give us some conﬁdence that pooling is appropriate,
because, as can be observed from Table 3, there is no evidence to reject the null hy-
pothesis of equality of the survival functions of both groups. Therefore, in the rest
9Note that in continuous time there should be no ties in time of failure among banks. Never-
theless, in practice ties are observed.
11of the paper we treat all the institutions as one group. The Kaplan-Meier survival
function for the whole group of institutions is shown in Figure 2.
Table 3: Test for equality of the survivor functions
Ho : Both groups have equal survival functions
Test χ2(1) Prob>χ2
Log − rank 0.45 0.5039
Wicoxon 0.41 0.5238
In order to estimate the hazard function, it is ﬁr s tr e q u i r e dt oo b t a i na ne s t i m a -
tion of the cumulative hazard function. The Nelson-Aalen non-parametric estimator









The hazard function can be estimated as a kernel-smoothed representation of





















where K() represents the kernel function, b is the bandwidth, and the summation
is over the total number of failures D that is observed (Klein and Moeschberger,
2003).
Figure 3 shows the estimated smoothed hazard function for the group of ﬁnancial
institutions. Note how the hazard rate of failure is clearly non-monotonic. Initially
it increases sharply up to approximately month 10, then decreases up to month
25, then increases a little and ﬁnally decreases from month 30 on. This behavior
of the baseline hazard reﬂects events applying to all institutions like changes in
10The kernel smoothed estimator of λ(t) is a weighted average of these “crude” estimates over
event times close to t. How close the events are is determined by b, the bandwidth, so that
events lying in the interval [t-b, t+b] are included in the weighted average. The kernel function
determines the weights given to points at a distance from t. Here we use the Epanechnikov kernel.
12macroeconomic conditions during the time of the study. Of particular importance,
there was a change in the exchange rate regime in September 1999, from a crawling-
peg system to a free ﬂoating system.
The form of the estimated hazard function shows that the most commonly used
parametric models for the distribution of duration do not seem to be appropriate
for modeling the baseline hazard of bank failure in Colombia during the period of
ﬁnancial stress.
4.2 Proportional hazards
Our objective is to understand how bank speciﬁcv a r i a b l e sa ﬀected the conditional
probability of failure and time to failure after the shocks that initiated the ﬁnan-
cial crisis. In ordinary regression models, explanatory variables aﬀect the dependent
variable by moving its mean around. However, in duration models it is not straight-
forward to see how explanatory variables aﬀect duration, and the interpretation of
the coeﬃcients in these types of models depends on the particular speciﬁcation of
the model. But there are two widely used special cases in which the coeﬃcients can
be given a partial derivative interpretation: the proportional hazards model and the
accelerated lifetime model (Kiefer, 1988).
Following the previous literature on the application of duration models to bank
failure and building on the above analysis indicating that conventional candidates
for parametric models are inappropriate, this paper estimates a proportional hazards
model in which no parametric form is assumed for the baseline hazard function. As
shown below using a speciﬁcation test, this assumption seems to be appropriate for
the problem of interest.
Under the proportional hazards speciﬁcation the hazard rate can be written as
λ(t,x,β,λ0)=φ(x,β)λ0(t) (6)
where λ0 is the baseline hazard. Note that the eﬀe c to ft i m eo nt h eh a z a r dr a t e
is captured completely through the baseline hazard. One common speciﬁcation for
the function φ, which is followed in this paper, is φ(x,β)=e x p ( x0β),w h e r ex is a





for all k. Therefore, the coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the constant, proportional
eﬀect of the corresponding covariate on the conditional probability of completing a
spell. In the particular case of bank failure, completing a spell is associated with
the moment in which a bank is liquidated.
4.3 Estimation technique
In the case of speciﬁcations which model the baseline hazard explicitly by mak-
ing use of a particular parametric model, estimation can be done by the method
of maximum likelihood. When the baseline hazard is not explicitly modeled, the
conventional estimation method is partial likelihood estimation, developed by Cox
(1972). The key point of the method is the observation that the ratio of the hazards










Suppose there are n observations and there is no censoring. If there are no
ties, durations can be ordered from the shortest to the longest, t1 <t 2 <. . .<t n.
Note that the index denotes both the observation and the moment of time in which
the duration for that particular observation ends. The contribution to the partial








the ratio of the hazard of the individual whose spell ended at duration tj to the sum
of the hazards of the individual whose spells were still in progress at the instant


























By maximizing equation (11) with respect to β, estimators of the unknown
parameter values are obtained. The intuition behind partial likelihood estimation
is that without knowing the baseline hazard only the order of durations provides
information about the unknown coeﬃcients.
When there is censoring, the censored spells will contribute to the log-likelihood
function by entering only in the denominator of the uncensored observations. Cen-
sored observations will not enter the numerator of the log-likelihood function at
all.
Ties in durations can be handled by several diﬀerent methods. In this paper,
ties are handled by applying the Breslow method. In continuous time ties are not
expected. Nevertheless, given that the moment of failure in practical applications
is aggregated into groups (here months), ties are possible, and in fact they occur.
Suppose we have 4 individuals a1,a 2,a 3,a 4,i nt h er i s kp o o la n di nac e r t a i nm o m e n t
a1 and a2 fail. The Breslow method says that, given it is unknown which of the
failures preceded the other, the largest risk pool will be used for both failures. In
other words, this method assumes that a1 failed from the risk pool a1,a 2,a 3,a 4,a n d
a2 also failed from the risk pool a1,a 2,a 3,a 4. The Breslow method is an approxi-
mation of the exact marginal likelihood, and is used when there are not many ties
at a given point in time.
155 Estimation results
The model was estimated using the partial likelihood method. Results are presented
in Table 4, which shows the values of the estimated coeﬃcients and their standard
errors. One ﬁrst important conclusion from Table 4 is that the null hypothesis that
none of the indicators included in the model is important in explaining the behavior
of duration is clearly rejected. This provides evidence that supports the idea that
failure of ﬁnancial institutions during the period of ﬁnancial stress can be explained
by diﬀerences in ﬁnancial health and prudence existing across institutions. Given
our focus on capitalization and the diﬀerences observed in the median values of this
ratio for banks and ﬁnancial companies, we included a slope dummy (DCAP) to
test whether the eﬀect of this variable on the hazard rate diﬀers between the two
t y p e so fi n s t i t u t i o n s .T h e" t "s t a t i s t i cf o rt h et e s to ft h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h ee ﬀect
of this interaction variable is zero, is 0.21. This is not a surprising value under the
null; the probability under the null of seeing this or a higher value is 0.83. Thus,
we focus discussion on the constrained estimates in the last 2 columns of Table 4.
Regarding the role played by individual indicators, it can be seen that the sin-
gle most signiﬁcant ﬁnancial ratio in explaining the inter-institution variability in
the hazard rate is the capitalization ratio. The sign of the coeﬃcient is negative,
implying that an increase in the capitalization ratio for a given bank results in a
reduction of its probability of failing at every moment of time, everything else con-
stant. This is the expected result, consistent with previous studies and verifying the
importance to both the institutions and their supervisors of following the evolution
of this ratio over time. More important and novel is the ﬁnding that the variable
CAPL aﬀects the hazard rate signiﬁcantly and with the expected negative sign11.
This provides evidence in favor of a non-linear eﬀect of the capitalization ratio on
the probability of failure. Therefore, improvements in this ratio are more important
for poorly capitalized banks than for banks with better capitalization levels. This
result can be explained intuitively. It can be expected that there is a capitaliza-
tion level over which a bank no longer beneﬁts from a further increase, and, on the
11Table 4 reports the results setting the value of C equal to 10.2 percent. Nevertheless, these
results remain valid for values of C in the range from 10 to 11 percent.
16contrary, could loose proﬁtable lending opportunities. The estimated coeﬃcients
for CAP and CAPL imply that a one percentage point increase in the capitaliza-
tion ratio will lead to a 6.0 percent reduction of the instantaneous probability of
failure for a well-capitalized bank (capitalization greater than C; for these speciﬁc
numbers C=10.2%. Very similar results hold for a range of values of C), while it
will lead to a 25.3 percent reduction in the same probability for a poorly-capitalized
bank (capitalization less than C), everything else being constant. Note that this
direct interpretation of the coeﬃcient compares a percentage point change with a
percentage change. Given these coeﬃcient estimates, a one percent increase in cap-
italization from the cutoﬀ v a l u eo f1 0 . 2p e r c e n tw i l lr e d u c et h es a m p l ea v e r a g ep e r
period failure rate from 0.81 percent to 0.76 percent, while a one percent decrease
in capitalization will increase the rate to 1.02%.12.
Table 4: Partial likelihood estimation results
Unconstrained model Constrained model
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Err. Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
CAP -.0595 .0302 -.0596 .0302
CAPL -.2057 .1141 -.1933 .0975
EFF -.1684 .2096 -.1434 .1738
PROF -.1696 .1256 -.1572 .1108
LOAN -.0128 .0151 -.0128 .0152
COMP .0067 .0097 .0078 .0083
SIZE -.0011 .0005 -.0011 .0005
DCAP .0077 .0366
Log-likelihood -97.81 -97.83
LR χ2(d.f.) 25.45 (8) 25.41 (7)
Prob>χ2 .0013 .0006
Another important variable in explaining the hazard rate is bank’s size (SIZE).
12A one percent change in the capitalization ratio is rather large and is not frequently observed in
a short period for a ﬁnancial institution. Therefore, the numerical interpretation of the coeﬃcients
here should be considered as a reference only.
17The sign is negative, indicating that, ceteris paribus, increases in this variable de-
crease the risk of failure of a bank. This eﬀect is the expected one, as it seems
reasonable to assume that an institution’s size as measured by assets is important
as reﬂecting lower risk due to increased diversiﬁcation possibilities, due to possi-
ble economies of scale, or as a proxy of how long the bank has been in business.
Proﬁtability (PROF) is also important and its coeﬃcient is negative, as expected,
although its signiﬁcance is lower.
As a robustness test for the results shown above, changes to the speciﬁcation of
the model were done by excluding variables and by including new ones. In all the
diﬀerent speciﬁcations, the signs of CAP and CAPL remained unchanged, and the
values of the coeﬃcients were stable. The same holds for regressions done exlcuding
outlyers with very high and low capitalization levels.
The interpretation of the results presented in Table 4 rely on the proportional
hazards assumption. Therefore, it is important to test whether this assumption is
a sensible one in the context studied here. This can be done formally using the
Schoenfeld’s residuals test. The idea is that the proportional hazards factorization
implies that the eﬀect of the covariates on the hazard function is constant over
time. Testing the hypothesis that the eﬀects of the covariates do not vary over
time is equivalent to testing for a zero slope in a generalized linear regression of
the residuals on time. The null hypothesis of the test is that the slope is zero. A
rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the proportional hazards assumption
is unsuitable. It is a conventional practice to do a test of each covariate as well as
a global test. Most absolute "t"’s were small, and the joint test statistic, a χ2(7)
random variable, takes the value 9.53, not a surprising value under the null that
all the coeﬃcients are zero. This provides evidence that the proportional hazards
assumption is adequate in the context of the model of bank failure.
Figure 4 shows the estimated survival function evaluated at the mean values of
all the predictors. Of course, this lines up well with the raw survivor function plotted
in Figure 2. Figure 5 shows the estimated hazard functions evaluated with the value
of capital one percentage point below the break value, at the break value, and one
percentage point above. The other predictors are held constant at their means.
18Figure 5 gives striking summary evidence on the importance of capitalization on
the likelihood of default in a period of ﬁnancial stress.
6 Time varying regressors
The model estimated in the previous section is practically useful for banks and
supervisors, in the sense that the probability that a bank fails in a certain future
period can be calculated using only ﬁnancial data on the bank that is currently avail-
able. Tests of the proportional hazards assumption showed that the speciﬁcation
considered previously is adequate. As a further description of the failure process,
from a somewhat diﬀerent point of view, we consider a regression model with time
varying covariates. The speciﬁcation is retained, but now monthly observations on
each regressor from June 1998 to December 2001 are used.
Table 5 shows the results of the regression done by partial likelihood estimation,
using time varying covariates. The signs of the coeﬃcients of the variables remain
unchanged. Some changes are observed regarding the signiﬁcance levels of the vari-
ables. Particularly, the signiﬁcance of capitalization is reduced, while proﬁtability
gains signiﬁcance. The chi-squared statistic, twice the diﬀerence in loglikelihood
values, for the test of the joint hypothesis that the eﬀects of CAP and CAPL is
zero, is 3.78. On two degrees of freedom, the probability under the null of seeing
this or a higher value is 0.15.
When combined with the previous results, we conclude that, when considering a
bank’s viability into the future, current capitalization is the key ﬁnancial variable.
When considering immediate risk, current proﬁtability is also important. Perhaps
both variables are important indicators of ﬁnancial health, but proﬁtability is more
idiosyncratic and has a more immediate eﬀect, while capitalization is a less-noisy
indicator of ﬁnancial health. Thus, proﬁtability at a point in time reﬂects "shocks"
speciﬁct ot h a tp e r i o d ,w h i l ec a p i t a l i z a t i o ni sl e s sa ﬀected by single-period shocks.
Proﬁtability looses signiﬁcance in the longer run, probably because current prof-
itability is not a good forecast of future proﬁtability, while capitalization, aﬀected
by accumulated proﬁts, is less temporally variable.
19Table 5: Time varying regressors
Unconstrained model Constrained model
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Err. Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
CAP -.0045 .0149
CAPL -.0286 .0229
EFF -.0064 .0524 -.0006 .0516
PROF -.0433 .02100 -.0686 .0147
LOAN -.0222 .0126 -.0151 .0101
COMP .0003 .0070 .0027 .0068
SIZE -.0007 .0003 -.0009 .0004
Log-likelihood -93.59 -95.48
LR χ2(d.f.) 42.74 (7) 38.96 (5)
Prob>χ2 .0000 .0000
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper identiﬁes the main bank speciﬁc determinants of time to failure during
the ﬁnancial crisis in Colombia. Using an unusually informative data set and a du-
ration model with partial likelihood estimation, we show that the process of failure
of ﬁnancial institutions during that period is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by diﬀerences in
ﬁnancial health and prudence existing across institutions. Our speciﬁcation tests
show that the proportional hazard speciﬁcation is appropriate for our sample, while
popular parametric speciﬁcations of the baseline hazard are unsatisfactory.
When looking ahead, the capitalization ratio is the most signiﬁcant of the the
relevant indicators that explain bank failure. Increases in this ratio lead to a reduc-
tion in the hazard rate of failure at any given moment in time. This ratio exhibits
a non-linear component, implying that the impact of increases in this variable is
more important for less capitalized banks. This result, which appears to be intu-
itive and appealing, agrees with the literature on capital crunch that suggests that
banks’ capital is crucial for real decisions taken by banks, such as portfolio choices.
20Related previous studies have found capitalization to be a signiﬁcant variable ex-
plaining the conditional probability of failure, however none identiﬁes a nonlinear
component. Other important variables explaining bank failure dynamics are bank’s
size and proﬁtability.
When using time varying covariates, proﬁtability gains signiﬁcance as a short
run indicator of instantaneous failure. This result indicates that proﬁtability is an
important indicator of within-period feasibility of the bank, while capitalization is
a less-noisy indicator of ﬁnancial health.
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Figure 5: Top: CAP at 9.2%; Middle: CAP at 10.2%; Bottom: CAP at 11.2%
28table2.txt
TABLE 2
          Beg.          Net            Survivor      Std.
  Time    Total   Fail   Lost           Function     Error     [95% Conf. Int.]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bank=0 
     1       43      2      1             0.9535    0.0321     0.8266    0.9882
     6       40      1      0             0.9297    0.0392     0.7975    0.9768
     7       39      0      2             0.9297    0.0392     0.7975    0.9768
    10       37      2      0             0.8794    0.0507     0.7339    0.9480
    11       35      1      0             0.8543    0.0551     0.7037    0.9318
    12       34      1      0             0.8291    0.0589     0.6743    0.9148
    17       33      0      1             0.8291    0.0589     0.6743    0.9148
    19       32      1      0             0.8032    0.0625     0.6443    0.8965
    23       31      1      0             0.7773    0.0657     0.6151    0.8776
    26       30      2      1             0.7255    0.0708     0.5586    0.8379
    28       27      0      1             0.7255    0.0708     0.5586    0.8379
    29       26      1      0             0.6976    0.0733     0.5282    0.8161
    33       25      0      1             0.6976    0.0733     0.5282    0.8161
    35       24      1      0             0.6685    0.0758     0.4969    0.7931
    37       23      1      0             0.6395    0.0779     0.4664    0.7694
    39       22      1      0             0.6104    0.0796     0.4367    0.7452
    41       21      1      0             0.5813    0.0809     0.4077    0.7204
    42       20      0     20             0.5813    0.0809     0.4077    0.7204
bank=1 
     3       39      0      2             1.0000         .          .         .
     5       37      1      0             0.9730    0.0267     0.8232    0.9961
     6       36      0      1             0.9730    0.0267     0.8232    0.9961
     8       35      1      0             0.9452    0.0377     0.7980    0.9860
    11       34      2      0             0.8896    0.0521     0.7319    0.9571
    13       32      2      0             0.8340    0.0619     0.6672    0.9218
    17       30      1      0             0.8062    0.0658     0.6359    0.9025
    18       29      0      1             0.8062    0.0658     0.6359    0.9025
    20       28      1      0             0.7774    0.0695     0.6036    0.8820
    23       27      1      0             0.7486    0.0726     0.5722    0.8606
    32       26      1      0             0.7198    0.0753     0.5415    0.8384
    40       25      1      0             0.6910    0.0776     0.5115    0.8157
    41       24      1      0             0.6622    0.0795     0.4821    0.7923
    42       23      0     23             0.6622    0.0795     0.4821    0.7923
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 1